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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews recent empirical research studying the impact of the
U.S. corporate income tax on the behavior of firms. Four areas are discussed:
(1) The extent to which dividend taxation imposes a "double tax" on
corporate source earnings;
(2) The historical impact of tax incentives on the incentives to invest
and the value of corporate equity;
(3) The effects of limited loss offset provisions on the incentives to
invest in risky assets; and







Corporate income tax revenues have declined steadily as a fraction of
U.S. GNPoverthe past three decades, from 5.3 percent in 1953 to 4.1 percent,
3.3 percent and 1.8 percent in 1963, 1973 and 1983, respectively.1 Indeed,
this decline is even more striking if one subtracts from corporate revenues
the remittances by the Federal Reserve System of their seignorage. In fiscal
year 1983, corporation income tax receipts net of these payments were only
37.0 billion dollars,2 or just over six percent of federal revenues.
This trend might appear to have clear implicatIons both for the
distribution of after—tax income in the United States and for the incentives
that corporations have to invest in plant and equipment. But such aggregate
tax measures can be very misleading because they are, at the same time, too
comprehensive and yet incomplete. They do not relay the different incentives
and burdens imposed on different investors and different assets, nor do they
account for other taxes which, in combination with the corporate tax,
determine the tax burden on owners of corporate capital and the incentives
that such individuals have to invest via the corporation.
In this paper, we discuss four related issues that must be considered
before the economic effects of the corporate tax can be understood. These are
the additional taxes on corporate source income levied on dividends, capital
gains and interest payments, the presence in the tax code of investment
incentives such as accelerated depreciation, the corporate tax treatment of
risky income, and the determinants and implications of corporate borrowing.
We conclude with a review of this discussion.
II.Shareholders' Taxes and"Double"Taxation
Many who favor a reduction in taxes paid by corporations see such a
1reduction as an off8et to the "double" taxation occurring when corporate
profits are taxed at the corporate level and then,if distributed, at the
shareholder level. Compared to investment income from an unincorporated
business, there is, indeed, a second layer of taxation.Even for earnings
that are retained, associated increases in the corporation's value may
eventually be subject to individual capital gains taxes.
Traditional economic analysis3 suggests that such a pattern of taxation
discourages corporate investment and, by doing so, causes partof the extra
tax burden to be shifted from corporate shareholders toothers in the economy:
other investors, who find their returns diminished by the floodof capital
from the corporate sector; purchasers of corporate commodities, who must pay
higher prices for goods that have become more expensive to produce;and,
potentially) wage earners, if the demand for labor is lessintensive in the
expending areas outside the corporate sector than withinit.
Associated also with this hypothesized shift in resources is an economic
distortion, in that investors are being encouraged by the tax system to forego
relatively more profitable corporate sector projects toavoid the extra
taxation.
But the taxation of dividends does not necessarily lead to this typeof
outcome. The question is best put in the following way:does the taxation of
dividends mean that corporations must earn a higher rate of return,before
tax, to satisfy their shareholders' requiredafter—tax return? The answer may
very well be that they need not do so.Consider an investment financed by the
method most commonly used to raise equity capital, the retentionof
earnings. Suppose the potential project will earn 10 percent a yearafter
corporate taxes, all of which will be distributed asdividends. These
dividends will then be subject to additional taxes, unless the shareholders
2are exempt from taxation.But this does not mean a lower rate of return than
10 percent for individual investors. For consider the initial investment
these investors made when the firm retained its earnings. The cost to
investors was the foregone dividends, less the taxes that would have been due
on such dividends. For the sake of concreteness, suppose the typical
investor's marginal tax rate is 40 percent. Then, per dollar of retained
earnings, the investor hadtogive up 60 cents out of pocket to get this
stream of 10 percent returns, which will also be taxed at 40 percent to yield
a net return of 6 percent per gross invested dollar, but 10 percent of
foregone, after—tax dollars.
Lest this result be dismissed as anomalous, the reader should note its
equivalence to the treatment accorded individual savings under a consumption
tax, which is recognized to leave the return to savings effectively untaxed.
Under a consumption tax scheme, savers would receive a reduction in their tax
base for amounts saved through the corporation and add to the tax base amounts
received and not saved.
This argument suggests that while taxes on dividends may be paid, they
need not contitute a disincentive to save via the corporation. In this
sense, there is no double taxation: only the corporate income tax lowers the
saver's rate of return. As with a consumption tax, taxes on dividends
currently received represent the payment, with interest, of a tax liability
deferred by the previous retention of earnings.
A corollary of this view is that corporations face a higher marginal tax
burden when they must raise equity capital through the issuance of new shares,
because there is no initial reduction in stockholders' taxes when the shares
are issued.
Empirical evidence offers some support for this position. In Auerbach
3(1984), I attempted to measure how the rates of return required by
corporations on their investments differed according to a number of factors,
including how these investments were financed. Using data from the period
1963 to 1977 for 274 major American corporations (most listed on the New York
Stock Exchange, the remainder on the American Exchange), I first corrected
income statement information to give a truer measure of annual earnings, and
then estimated equations to determine the effects of a number of firm
characteristics on future earnings. One significant finding was that, for
given levels of investment, firms issuing new shares in a particular year
experienced higher increases in earnings in subsequent years than thosethat
invested solely through retentions and debt issues. The results suggested
that this sample of firms required, on average, about 4.8 percent more,after
tax, when financing investments through new issues.Additional evidence
suggested that this phenomenon is associated with individual taxation,rather
than other potential reasons for an aversion to new issues.
This finding has several interesting implications. First, corporate
stock will normally trade at a discount relative to the intrinsic valueof the
firm's assets. Ts is not due to any irrationality on the part of investors,
but to the fact that firms have the incentive to retain earnings as long as
the market value of new projects undertaken is at least equal totheir net
cost to investors. Hence, a retentions—financed project costing onemillion
dollars has a net cost of 600 thousand dollars to investorsin the 40 percent
tax bracket. The management of the firm will increase itsshareholders'
assets by undertaking the project as long as thefirm's value increase by at
least 600 thousand dollars, not a million.
Second, this discount means that there is an incentive for corporations
to invest in corporate stock, either their own, through repurchases, orthat
4of others; through acquisitions. This provides a direct way of obtaining
assets at a price below their intrinsic worth. The puzzle is why firms do not
engage in more of this kind of activity.
Third, a general reduction in the taxation of dividend income would have
very different consequences than reduced corporate taxation. Since the
dividend tax does not influence the marginal tax rate for investment financed
through retention, its reduction will not affect these investment decisions,
despite the decline in corporate revenue.
III. The Ipact of Inv'estaent Incentives
One reason for the decline in corporate tax collections since 1953 has
been a decline in corporate profitability. Another has been the reduction
(from 52 percent to 46 percent) in the corporate tax rate. However, the most
important factor has been the introduction of several investment incentives,
culminating in the Accelerated Cost Recovery System instituted in 1981. For a
number of reasons, the effects of these programs on the incentive to invest
cannot be judged from trends in corporate tax revenues.
First, these programs were generally not retroactive. As a result,
there could be relatively small change in actual tax payments in the years
immediately following a new investment incentive, particularly for
corporations with slower growth. However, even several years after such a
program's enactment, concurrent tax payments offer little guidance about the
corporation's incentive to invest. This is because investment incentives such
as the investment tax credit or the shortening of depreciation lives work by
reducing income taxes in the years immediately following an investment. In
later years, the corporation will actually pay more taxes on the income from
the investment, since depreciation allowances will have been exhausted. The
5net effect to the corporation is positive, but is overstated by the tax
reduction in the earliest years. Hence, a fast growing corporation with a
very "young" capital stock might offset all its current tax liability,but
this will not be true in the future. A stagnant corporation with a very "old"
capital stock might have no tax credits or depreciation deductions at all, but
this overstates the tax burden on investment by failing to account for the tax
benefits that were received in the years soon after the firm's capital goods
were purchased.
In a sense, each investment faces a different tax rate on its income in
each year, with this rate increasing as the asset ages. What matters for the
investment decision is the present value of taxes paid over the asset's entire
life, not the taxes paid in a given year.
This point may be illustrated by a numerical example. Imagine an asset
purchased for 1000 dollars, yielding twenty percent per year before
depreciation, and receiving a ten percent investment tax credit and a standard
five—year ACRS write—off. Suppose that the asset actually depreciates at ten
percent per year. That is, each year its income is ten percent lower thanin
the previous year. Also suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that there is no
inflation. Then the asset's income and tax payments over time are as given in
Table 1. Shown in parentheses below actual depreciation allowances are those
that would correspond to the real or "economic" depreciation of the asset, of
ten percent per year. This figure is deducted from gross income to obtain a
measure of actual economic income, against which taxes are compared to obtain
each year's tax rate for the asset.
Because of the investment incentives, this tax rate is negative for the
first five years but very positive thereafter. It would be no more correct to
say that firms with three year old assets have a tax rate of—21 percent
6Table 1
Tax Rates for a Rypothetical Asset
Year
-
Gross 200 180 162 146 131 118 106
Inco
Dnritinn 143 20 200 200 200 C) C)
(100) (90) (81) (73) (66) (59) (53)
Investment 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
Credit
Taxes —74 —13 —17 —25 —32 +54 +49
Rconoic 100 90 81 73 65 59 53
Income
TaxR.ate(Z) —74 —14 —21 —34 —49 +92 +92
7(never mind how they manage to obtain these refunds —wereturn to this below)
than that firms with six year old assets face one of +92 percent.The overall
impact is somewhere in between.
This impact can be measured by taking the present value of taxes paid
and finding the constant tax rate on economic income thatwould yield the same
value. Table 2, taken from Auerbach (1983), gives thesecalculations for two
types of assets, general industrial equipmentand industrial structures, and
for all corporate fixed assets as a whole, for the years 1953—82. They are
based under the assumptions that corporations used the most generousavailable
tax treatment in each year, that they required a returnof four percent after
tax and that they projected inflation based on pastinflation behavior. Aside
from the general decline in tax rates, except for a few years duringthe
1970's, there has been a shift in the tax burden from equipment to
structures. This would appear to present the incentivefor corporations to
invest more in equipment, relative to structures, than is sociallydesirable,
but there is an important qualification to this conclusion thatwill be
discussed below in the section dealing with corporate borrowing.
The negative tax rate for equipment in 1981 means that the negativetax
liabilities of the early years (as illustrated in Table 1) outweighedthe
positive ones of later year8. Such investmentsled to a net tax refund for
investing corporations.
Aside from the distinction between these effective tax ratesand those
tax rates calculated by comparing current taxes tocurrent income, there are
other important implications of the presence of incentivesin the tax
structure. First is the increased possibilityof negative tax liabilities,
even for profitable firms. Because of the corporatetax treatment of losses,
this may have a very unpredictable impact on theincentives for firms to
8Table 2








1953 64.1 55.6 58.8
1)'+ O1.U DZ.i D).)
1955 58.2 50.6 53.5
1956 59.3 51.3 54.3
1957 60.2 51.9 55.0
1958 60.9 52.3 55.6
1959 59.7 51.5 54.6
1960 60.4 52.0 55.1
1961 58.8 51.0 53.9
1962 40.3 49.1 43.3
1963 41.5 49.6 44.0
1964 27.4 47.1 37.2
1965 26.1 45.5 35.7
1966 27.4 45,8 36.5
1967 49.4 46.6 45.5
1968 37.0 51.5 43.5
1969 41.0 52.7 45.8
1970 53.5 52.0 49.7
1971 53.2 51.2 49.1
1972 16.4 51.2 32.9
1973 14.4 50.9 31.8
1974 18.3 51.5 33.9
1975 24.1 52.6 37.0
1976 26.4 53.1 35.1
1977 21.2 52.1 32.0
1978 23.2 52.4 33.2
1979 19.0 50.3 30.1
1980 22.0 50.8 31.9
1981 —6.8 41.7 17.7
1982 8.4 42.1 24.6
9invest. Second, because new assets have yet to receive their investment
incentives, they will be worth more to corporations than otherwise identical
but older assets already in place. Refer again to Table 1, and imagine a
company with two pieces of equipment of comparable productive capacity. One
was just purchased, while the other is six years old. The first is clearly
more valuable, because it has the prospect of five years of refunds before it
must start paying taxes. All the older asset has in its future is years with
no depreciation deductions at all. Not only does it receive no investment
incentIves, but It xist repay the deferred taxes associated with the forward
shifting of depreciation allowances.
What this means is that, per dollar of capital, existing assets will
generally be worth less than new assets. The estimated extent of this
discount is shown in Table 3, again taken from my 1983 paper. The number
shown is the ratio of the total value of the aggregate corporate fixed capital
stock, taking accounts of these tax differentials, to the value these assets
would have if all were equally productive but treated as new assets by the tax
law. Based on the size of the corporate capital stock, I calculated this gap
between actual value and replacement cost to be 427 billion dollars in 1982.
This was the present value then of taxes due on old assets in excess of the
taxes on comparable new assets. Combined with the capitalization effect
associated with dividends, discussed in the previous section, this has the
potential to explain a large gap between the intrinsic value of assets owned
by corporations and their stock market values.
IV.The Corporate TaxandRiak—Taking
There areseveral ways in which the corporate tax affects the decision
toinvest in risky assets. In each case, a corporatiOn'8 tax payments as a
10Table 3
Ratio of arket Value to Replacement Cost:
































11percentage of income offer little guidance about the incentives actually
faced.
Perhaps the most important of these effects is associated with the
corporate income tax's asymmetric treatment of a corporation's gains and
los8es. Income is fully taxable, but losses do not lead to a refund at the
corporate rate. Instead, taxpayers must either carry the losses back for an
immediate refund, or if recent income is insufficient, carry the losses
forward to await deduction against future income or expiration. Further,
similar restrictions exist on the use of tax credits, such as the investment
tax credit.
This asymmetry means that a corporation with risky income will, in
present value, pay more taxes in the future than if the income had the same
expected return but were always positive. Hence, risk taking is affected.
But to know how it is affected, one must know the firm's current tax status as
well as the types of projects it is considering. Indeed, it is possible that
firms with taxable income, paying taxes', are at an advantage relative to firms
that are not. This is more likely given the recently increased acceleration
of depreciation allowances discussed in the previous section.
While the prospect of not being able to get a refund for potential
losses may discourage the undertaking of risky projects, firms that already
have incurred such losses may carry forward a tax shield to reduce taxes on
future income, thereby lowering taxes in the future. If, on average, the firm
expected its current investments to yield additional tax liability, this
shield would provide an added incentive to invest. However, as shown by the
example in Table 1, many investments now will generate negative tax
liabilities in their early years, even if they earn a normal rate of return.
Hence, a tax shield carried forward mayactuallymake such investments less
12attractive, by making the deduction of these additional lo8ses impossible.
This is offset by the fact that in subsequent years when the a8SetS generate
positive tax liabilities, these are more likely to be shielded from taxation.
To measure the net impact of these effects, I considered in Auerbacl-t
(1983) how the expected present value of taxes associated with different
assets would be affected by a firm's initial tax status and the probability of
this tax status changing from year to year. Using data from 1959 to 1978 for
several hundred major U.S. corporations, I estimated the probability of having
a net tax loss carryforward in any given year and the probability that this
loss would be exhausted in the next and subsequent years. I then measured the
taxes that representative firms, purchasing an asset with a riskless, six
percent return annually after depreciation, would expect to pay in each year
over the asset's life. Each calculation proceeded in two steps. First, the
annual accrued tax liability for each year, such as those shown in Table 1,
was calculated. Then, estimates were made of when, statistically, each of
these liabilities would actually result in a tax payment. Since a firm might
have a tax loss carryforward (from other parts of its operations) in each
year, there is some probability that each year's tax payment wouldbe
deferred, more so for firms beginning with a large tax loss carryforward in
the year of the investment.
To test the effect of different conditions on the results, I performed
these calculations for both industrial equipment and industrial structures,
for zero, medium and high rates of inflation, and under depreciation
provisions that existed in 1965, 1972 and 1982. For each assumption of asset
types, inflation rate, and tax law, the calculation was done for two
representative corporations: one starting off with a substantial current tax
liability and the potential for a tax loss carryback, and one beginning with a
13large tax 1088 carryforward. These firms are labeled "high tax" and "low tax"
for the results shown in Table 4. The numbers in the table are "effective"
tax rates, as described above, calculated as the tax rate on economic income
that would leave firms with the same expected present value of taxes from the
investment.
The table offers a number of familiar results. For each type of
investor and asset, the tax changes from 1972 to 1982 led to lower tax
liabilities. For any given asset, investor and year, an increase in the
inflation rate led to higher tax payments because of the declining real value
of depreciati'i allowances. As depicted above, recent tax changes have
greatly increased the relative tax incentive to invest in equipmentinstead of
structures.
The main new result in the table is that firms in the "high tax"
position were likely to pay less in taxes on their new investments than their
"low tax" counterparts, because of the greater likelihood of obtaining the
full value of the early years' egative tax liabilities. This has become
especially true for equipment since the most recent t* law changes. Hence,
the observation of a firm paying a larger fraction of its earnings in taxes
than another is certainly a poor guide to the relative incentives for these
firms to undertake new investment.
An implication of these findings is that those firms with existing
profitable operations providing taxable income are better disposed to
undertake new investments, either directly or through the purchase of other
firmsmakingthese investments. Once again, thetaxsystem provides an extra
incentive for the acquisition of one firm by another.
14Table 4




Taxlaw and ____________________ ____________________
inflationrate Lowtax Rightax Low tax Rightax
1965taxlaw
No inflation 17 12 37 37
4 percent 33 30 48 48
8percent 47 43 53
1972taxlaw
Noinflation 12 7 40 38
4percent 28 23 52 52
8 percent 40 35 57 57
1982taxlaw
Noinflation —3 —15 27 25
4percent 10 —3 37 35
8percent 20 5 42 42
15V. DeterinantS of Corporate Leverage
An element of corporate policy that adds to each of the preceding ones
and helps tie them together is the debt—equity decision.While the advantages
of retaining earnings instead of issuing new shares are fairly clear,the
decision of how much growth to finance internally and how much throughthe
floatation of debt has many interesting and complex aspects. How ich
corporations borrow, when they borrow, and the maturity structureof their
borrowing all have theories to explain them, but these theories areoften
incomplete predictors of actual behavior.
The tax law plays a central role in most models of corporate leverage,
and its recent changes motivate soie of the current interest in the question
of what determines corporate borrowing. As shown above in Sections IIIand
IV, estimates suggest that the effective ta rates on structureslie
substantially above those on equipment. !urther, nondepreciable assets,such
as land and inventories, do not qualify for anyinvestment incentives
comparable to those available for plant and equipment.This suggests that
there exists a potentially serious distortion in the choice of corporate
investments, but such a conclusion is necessarily valid onlyif a separation
prevails between real and financial corporate decisions. If,in contrast,
there are tax advantages to borrowing, and leverage is more acceptableto
corporations when investing in structures or land than equipment,this might
act as an offset to the tax disadvantage of the former assetsto which we have
already alluded.
In Auerbach (1985), I estimated models of the determinants of corporate
borrowing. Before discussing the actual results, itwill be useful to review
briefly some of the theories that lie behind the model.
Most theories of corporate leverage begin with the twinobservations
16that corporate taxation appears to bias the choice of financial policy
completely toward debt, and that corporations typically finance perhaps only
one quarter of their accumulations of capital by issuing debt, The challenge
is to explain why this is so.
The most basic explanation for observed debt—equity ratios is costly
bankruptcy. However, empirical evidence tends to refute the notion that
potential bankruptcy costs alone are of the same magnitude as the corporate
tax advantage to debt. In addition, though, additional borrowing may lead to
other costs, referred to in the finance literature as "agency" costs,
associated with the idea that it is difficult for holders of long—term bonds
in a firm to protect themselves from the firm taking subsequent action that is
detrimental to their interests, such as the commencement of an extremely risky
new investment program. With limited corporate liability, this act imparts
some of the program's risk to debt—holders. In anticipation of such behavior,
lenders might demand a high risk premium from firms with a high probability of
engaging in such activity, such as firms with high debt—equity ratios.
One would expect a firm's potential agency costs to differ according to
a number of characteristics in addition to its debt—equity ratio. Myers
(1977) suggests that the problem is more acute for "growth" firms whose value
derives largely from anticipated future decisions, since they possess more
flexibility as to their actions. Presumably, the same argument holds for
firms whose capital stock has a short maturity, for these firms' future
replacement investment decisions loom much larger. This could be a reason for
firms that use structures relatively more than equipment in their production
processes to borrow more, or at least borrow more long term.
Additional explanations for the limitation on corporate borrowing come
from suggestions that other tax factors act, cumulatively, to offset the tax
17advantage to borrowing, so that at a certain point, the net tax advantage to
borrowing disappears. At the corporate level, the tax advantage to debt i8
lost if firms do not have sufficient taxable income to deduct their interest
payments. As firms borrow more and attempt to deduct more interest,this
eventuality becomes ever more likely. This is the essence of the argument
offered by DeArigelo and Masulis (1980). The hypothesis has a number of
testable implications. First, firms with substantial loss carryforwards
should choose to issue less debt. (Here, care must be taken since such firms
may also be in greater need of funds.) Second, firms investingin assets with
a greater fraction of their total after—tax returns generated by tax credit8
and deductions should also use less debt finance1 for they will typically have
less taxable income for any given level of borrowing. Again, this is a reason
why firms might borrow less to finance purchases of equipment. Finally, one
would expect that firms with riskier earnings streams would be less likely to
borrow, for these firms would face a more likely prospect of having
insufficient taxable income, in any given year, to deduct all interest
payments.
As with the pure bankruptcy explanation, this "limited tax shield"
argument, by itself, is unlikely to be important enough to explain the typical
firm's observed borrowing behavior. As part of the study of tax losses in
Auerbach (1983), I estimated the present value of tax deductions from an
additional dollar of debt for a typical firm, and found that such a firm could
expect to get about 92 percent of the value of thesedeductions.
Equivalently, this would be as if firms could deduct interest payments
regardless of their own tax status, but at a 42 percent rather than 46 percent
tax rate. This is still a substantial tax benefit.
However, this differential is diminished by the consideration of
18personal taxes. Miller (1977) argued that the individual tax advantages to
equity may offset those to debt at the firm level. The basic argumentis that
since, at the individual level, interest payments are taxable, while only
dividends and not capital gains are taxed fully, the individual tax burden on
the return to equity is lower than that on debt. In its simplest form, this
explanation i8 implausible, since the corporate tax on all equity earnings
plus the additional dividend taxation of that part of the individual return to
equity that is distributed to shareholders is substantially higher than the
IndIvIdual tax on interest income, regardless of the individual's tax
bracket. However, this effect may lessen the initial tax advantage to
leverage and, in conjunction with other reasons for limits on leverage given
above, may help explain observed behavior.
Moreover, as argued above in Section II, though individual stockholders
pay taxes on dividends, these taxes do not necessarilyconstitute a burden on
the current return to equity. Because the value of the firm may be discounted
to account for the presence of the dividend tax, the tax itself does not lower
the return on investment for an equity holder. This point makes Miller's
original argument more realistic, for it means that the onlyadditional
taxation of equity earnings besides the corporate tax itself is the individual
capital gains tax.
In summary, explanations for borrowing limitations range over tax and
nontax factors. Among the latter include the potential bankruptcy and agency
costs that are thought to derive from additional leverage. Among the former
are the limited deductibility of additional interest payments bythe corporate
borrower and the offsetting tax advantages to equity at the individual level.
To test these different theories, I gathered balance sheet and income
statement data for the period 1958 to 1977 on 143 firms for which sufficient
19information was available about capital stock composition. All of the firms
chosen listed annual investment and capital 8toCkS separately for three
categories: structures, land the equipment.
As in the calculations described in Section II, the first step was to
correct several book measures, such as earnings and debt. The former had to
be corrected for inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, and
the latter for deviations from market value associated with interest rate
changes.
Once this was done, I used the data from all of the firms to estimate
models of short—term and long—term borrowing. The models specify that there
is, for each firm,adesired ratio of short—term debt to total value and long—
term debt to total value. The annual borrowing decision is modeled as being
one of partial adjustment, with the change in each ratio of debt to value
depending on three factors: the gap between desired long—term debt and its
current level, the gap between desired short—term debt and its current level,
and the "cash flow" gap between current investment funds needed and the amount
of funds available through retentions after a normal dividend distribution.
Hence, the amount of long—term (or short—term) borrowing is hypothesized to be
influenced by how much long—term debt the firm would like to add, how much
short—term debt it would like to add, and how much debt overall that it must
add if it is not to reduce its dividend growth or issue new equity shares.
The estimated equations indicate that firmscloseabout 44 percent of
thegapbetween desired and actual long—term debt to value ratios within one
year, but that short—term borrowing responds more rapidly, closing over 79
percent of its gap between desired and actual levels within one year. Both
formsofborrowing respond positively to the size of the cash flow deficit,
and short—term debt appears to increase also when there is a desire for more
20long—term debt, indicating a degree of substitutability between the two forms
of borrowing.
We turn next to the determinants of desired debt—value ratios. For both
long—term and short—term debt, we estimated the impact of a number of firm
characteristics. Included in this group are the tax loss carryforward (if
present) the earnings growth rate, the variance of earnings (adjusted for
borrowing) around trend, and the fraction of the firm's value accounted for by
land, structures, equipment, net current assets (including inventories), and ii 'rho •; .-; — a ._ac I.ccs ¼L¼1 aS.
difference between the aggregate replacement value of the firm's assets in the
other four categories and the market value of the firm itself. This is
intended to measure future earnings prospects, among other things.
There are many factors estimated to affect significantly the desired
debt—value ratios, but only some are consonant with the theories laid out
above. As expected, land appears to be the most heavily leveraged of all
assets, and goodwill is less associated with borrowing than land, equipment or
current assets. However, for both long—ternL and short—term debt, the assets
that are estimated to have the lowest associated debt—equity ratios are
structures. This is a puzzle for which I have no ready explanation. Also
puzzling is the impact on leverage of a firm's growth rate, although
here it mist be recalled that all of these firms studied are large "blue chip"
corporations. Hence, 1growth company" in this context does not have the usual
connotation of being a speculative enterprise. Finally, the effects of
earnings variance and tax 1088 carryforwards on leverage are not especially
perceptible.
Thus,the results offer no support for the propositionthat companies
investingprimarily in structures borrow more than companies investing in
21equipment, though land does seem to have greaterassociated borrowing. The
separation between real and financial decisionsdoes not appear to hold, but
neither does any combination of the theories reviewed abovesuffice to explain
completely this borrowing pattern. Hence,it is difficult to know how to
bring the tax advantage to debt intocalculations of overall tax incentives
facing investments of different types, thoughthere appears to remain a
substantial tax advantage to investing in equipment ratherthan structures.
f.1 .. V L•'.#1I. L'
Wehave discussed in each of the sections above how the impactof the
corporate tax is difficult to measurefrom observed revenue figures alone. It
will be useful to summarize them here.
First, the "double taxation" of dividendsis of highly questionable
existence. The payment of dividend taxes does not meanthat these taxes
affect the returns to current investors, because the taxeswill already be
reflected in the firm's market value via a discountrelative to the intrinsic
value of the firm's assets. Second, investment incentivesdefer tax payments
by corporations so that income from newer assetsis taxed less heavily than
that from older assets. This makes aggregate corporate tax payments
meaningless as economic indicators. Because of the relativelybigger tax
shield offered by new investments, older assets will carry adiscount in the
determination of a corporation's market value, leading to a second tax—
associated cause for the presence of a discount in the value of corporate
equity.
The riskiness of corporate investments combined with the asymmetryof
the corporate tax in its treatment of gains and losses meansthat the
corporation's incentive to invest depends on its tax status.Given the
22negative accrued tax liabilities in the early years after an investment is
made, associated with investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation, the
incentive to invest is greater for a firm that is currently taxable than for a
firm that is not.
Finally, the financial decision, if not made separately from the real
investment decision, may influence the investment choice among various
assets. Observed behavior indicates that financial and real decisions are
related, but not strictly according to any pattern predicted by prevailing
theories.
23Footnotes
1. Economic Report of the President, 1984, Tables Bi and B76.
2. Economic Report of the President, 1984, Table B72.
3. As in Harberger (1962).References
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